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In this paper, we empirically examine the short term overreaction effect in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange using daily stock data from January 1999 to December 2003. The study 
period covers the pre- and post- Turkish financial crisis period. Consistent with other 
prior studies on other markets, we find evidence of short term overreaction effect in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange prior and post financial crisis. Our analysis highlights that 
stocks that display a large price increase (winners) show an evidence of overreaction in 
the short run, however, stocks that display a large price decline (losers) indicate no 
significant evidence. We also find the price reversal for winners in pre-crisis period is 
more pronounced than in post-crisis period. These results indicate a diminished degree 
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Introduction 
The  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH)  states  that  all  relevant  information  is 
completely reflected in the price of financial assets and that change in the prices of 
financial  assets  can  not  be  predicted,  therefore,  failing  to  provide  abnormal  profit 
opportunities.  However,  in  recent  studies,  EMH  has  been  challenged  by  the 
documentation of “Overreaction Hypothesis” which shows that past prices can forecast 
future movements in prices and those profitable investment strategies can be created to 
take  advantage  of  overreaction  effect.  Therefore,  further  studies  of  the  overreaction 
phenomena  have  significant  implications  not  only  for  financial  academics  and 
practitioners but also for the investors.   
While the efficiency of stock markets has been studied mostly for developed markets, 
the analysis of the efficiency on emerging stock markets has begun in recent years. 
Empirically, the studies have found important differences among markets whether they 
are  classified  as  either  emerging  or  developed  markets  which  reveal  that  abnormal 
returns following the shocks are significantly larger for emerging markets. Some of the 
reasons behind the significant abnormal returns in those markets are the globalization 
effects, the removal of trade barriers and the advance in the communication technology. 
Therefore,  domestic  and  international  investors  can  gain  enormous  benefits  by 
diversifying their portfolios in these markets.     
Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  (ISE),  being  established  in  1986,  has  become  one  of  the 
rapidly  growing  emerging  markets.  As  a  leading  emerging  market,  ISE,  which  is 
smaller,  less  liquid  and  more  volatile  than  developed  markets  has  begun  to  suggest 
attractive investment alternatives to investors all around the world. The participation of 
foreign investors in the ISE has increased from 1.8 % in 1990 to 53.7 % in 1999 and 
reached to nearly above 75% in 2008.  
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the short term overreaction literature 
by using daily return stock data of Istanbul Stock Exchange over the period of 1999-
2003.  The  reason  of  selecting  this  time  period  is  to  investigate  the  impact  of  the 
February 2001 Turkish financial crisis. As our data extends to the period of Turkish 
financial  crisis,  this  will  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  trading  behaviors  of 
investors before and after the crisis. This paper contributes to the existing literature in 
some respects. First, this study examines the overreaction hypothesis in an emerging 
market,  ISE,  while  previous  studies  generally  have  focused  on  developed  markets. 
Second,  we  investigate  individual  company  stock  price  performance  rather  than  the 
portfolio performance regarding pre- and post- crisis reaction.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  gives  brief  review  in  this 
literature. Then, the data and methodology are discussed in section III. Empirical results 
are presented in the section IV and final section concludes.  
Literature Review  
All  available  information  is  fully  reflected  into  prices  of  financial  assets  in 
“informationally efficient” markets. Theoretically, abnormal returns cannot be earned 
by  using  investment  strategies  based  on  available  information.  One  of  the  potential 
challenge  for  the  “Efficient  Market  Hypothesis”  is  referred  to  as  the  ‘overreaction International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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phenomena” comes from DeBondt and Thaler (1985). They suggested, using U.S. data, 
which prior losers over a long term period outperform prior winner over a subsequent 
holding  period  of  the  same  length  of  time,  following  the  physiological  study  of 
Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1982),  who  argue  that  investors  tend  to  overweight  recent 
information and underweight prior information.  
More specifically, the strategy of buying the losers and short selling the winners will 
produce abnormal profits in the long run. These profits, called as contrarian profits, are 
due to the investors’ excessive optimist and pessimist reactions to information. Several 
studies have examined the overreaction hypothesis in financial markets in both short 
term and long-term horizons. Although the most recent studies have been based on the 
long-term  horizons,  the  evidence  on  the  cause  of  long  run  returns  reversals  are 
conflicting. However, there are a number of studies that attempt to reveal the evidence 
of the short-term return reversals, which are more consistent in favor of overreaction. 
Moreover,  investigating  short-term  overreaction  has  advantages  over  the  long-term 
overreaction tests. Lin (1988), who examined the daily, weekly and monthly returns for 
Taiwan Stock Market found the existence of overreaction. Brown and Harlow (1988) 
examined the overreaction issue by using monthly data of CRSP-listed NYSE firms in 
the period of 1946 and 1983. While the winners do not show any decline after the first 
month, the losers indicated large price reversals. Zarowin (1989) presented the existence 
of stock market overreaction in the short run by ranking the common stocks with respect 
to their performance during a given month and concluded that the market was weak 
form inefficient in the short run. Atkins and Dyl (1990) investigated the behavior of 
common stock prices in NYSE after a large price change during a single trading day and 
provided evidence of overreaction, especially in the case of price declines. Ferri and 
Chung-ki (1996) illustrated the evidence of overreaction hypothesis in the S&P 500 
index from 1962 to 1991 using daily data.  
In one of the more recent studies, Larson and Madura (2003) studied NYSE stocks that 
experienced  a  one-day  price  change  over  the  period  1988  to  1998  and  found 
overreaction effect in response to uninformed events for gainers and under-reaction in 
both  informed  and  uninformed  events  for  losers.  Ma  et.  al.  (2005)  examined  the 
overreaction hypothesis by studying the price reversal behavior of NYSE and Nasdaq 
securities between 1996 and 1997. While they provide evidence of overreaction effects 
for both Nasdaq gainers and losers, no such evidence is found for NYSE gainers and 
losers. 
Overreaction hypothesis is also investigated in some of the international markets, which 
are  Spain  (Alonso  and  Rubio  (1990)),  Canada  (Kryzanowsky  and  Zhang  (1992)), 
Australia  (Brailsford  (1992)),  UK  (Clare  and  Thomas  (1995)),  Japan  (Chang  et  al. 
(1995)),  Hong  Kong  (Akhigbe  et  al.  1998)),  Brazil  (DaCosta  and  Newton  (1994), 
Richards  (1997)),  New  Zealand  (Bowman  and  Iverson  (1998)),  China  (Wang  et  al. 
(2004)), Greece (Anthoniou et. al., 2005) and  London (Spyrou et.al., 2007).  
Data and Methodology 
For the empirical analysis, daily closing prices of 190 stocks traded in one of the major 
Turkish equity indices (ISE) are examined for the 4-year period between January 1999 
and December 2003. These sample data were obtained from the IBS. We divide the 
sample period into two sub-periods. The whole sample period consists of 1216 trading International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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days  in  which  the  first  consists  of  500  trading  days  from  January  5,  1999  through 
January 31, 2001 and the second period is composed of 716 trading days from February 
1, 2001 through December 31, 2003. We exclude some days in the sample period which 
have missing price data. 
To investigate the short-term overreaction effect, we firstly compute the raw return of 
stocks on each day t (ri, t) as the difference between today’s and previous day’s closing 
price (P) as follows: 
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Abnormal return for each stock on the two sub-periods is computed using a market-
adjusted model
1: 
i t i t i t AR r E r , , , ( ) = -                       (2) 
where  ARi,t is the abnormal return on each stock i for day t; ri,t is the return of each 
stock i on day t and E(ri,t ) is the expected return on each stock i for day t. The expected 
return is assumed to be the return on the market index.  
Based on the abnormal returns, winners and losers are selected for the two sub-periods. 
On each sample day, the stock with the lowest return is called as the “loser” of that day 
and the stock with the highest return is called as the “winner” of that day. Pre-crisis 
period sample includes 485 winners and losers and post-crisis period sample includes 
701 winners and losers. 
Finally, the abnormal returns for each loser and winner on each trading day from t= -7 
and  t=  +7  are  computed  and  then  the  average  abnormal  returns  for  each  loser  and 
winner on each trading day from t= -7 and t= +7 are cumulated over different days to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return: 
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Empirical Results  
The average daily abnormal returns from t = -7 and t = +7 for the winners and losers in 
pre- and post-crisis period are reported in Table 1 and 2 respectively. In those tables, 
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Table 1: Average Daily Abnormal Returns for ISE-100 Stocks that indicates a 
large one day price increase or decrease within the period of January 5, 1999 
through January 31, 2001 
  1999-2001   
Day(t)  Abnormal Return  t-statistics  Abnormal Return  t-statistics    
  The Winner Sample (N=485)  The Loser Sample (N=485)   
-7  0.581797  2.294814**  0.766884  2.784166***   
-6  0.341884  1.330598  1.076951  3.781300***   
-5  0.182781  0.703928  0.582405  2.126821**   
-4  -0.062553  -0.252161  0.532439  1.981085**   
-3  0.846486  3.410896***  1.477918  4.722299***   
-2  0.717411  2.543642**  1.429111  4.001720***   
-1  2.436467  6.466963***  1.052307  2.877353***   
0  16.025264  21.803987***  -11.277304  -19.230200***   
1  1.727013  4.459111***  -0.708542  -2.174070**   
2  -0.136683  -0.415161  -0.382208  -1.393640   
3  -0.715141  -2.309653**  -0.194723  -0.803960   
4  0.089952  0.301570  -0.112319  -0.456530   
5  0.186887  0.651885  -0.601330  -2.515440**   
6  -0.158658  -0.558179  -0.244671  -0.976040   
7  0.004440  0.016307  -0.360022  -1.543370   
  ***Denotes significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test) 
  **Denotes significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test)   
  *Denotes significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test) 
The average daily abnormal returns for the winners and losers in period 1999-2001 are 
shown  in  Table1.  In  this  table,  the  average  daily  abnormal  returns  obtained  by  the 
winners  are  negative  for  three  of  the  seven  days  following  the  large  one  day  price 
increase. However, the daily abnormal return on day t = 3 is statistically significant at 
the 5% level even though on day t = 2 and t =6 not statistically significant. After the 
large price increase which denotes day 0, the price reversal does not occur on the first 
day. However, the reversals take place on day 3 as the market is not able to correct its 
previous  information  in  a  timely  manner.  Moreover,  significant  positive  abnormal 
returns obtained on days t = -3, t = -2 and t =-1 are due to the information leakage.  
The large negative return that occurs on day t = 0 is the result of the large decline in 
price. As opposed to the winners, price reversals for losers can not be obtained in the 
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Table 2: Average Daily Abnormal Returns for ISE-100 Stocks that indicates a 
large one day price increase or decrease within the period of February 1, 2001 
through December 31, 2003 
   2001-2003 
Day(t)  Abnormal Return  t-statistics  Abnormal Return  t-statistics 
  The Winner Sample (N=701)  The Loser Sample (N=701) 
-7  0.618897  3.400242***  1.041148  5.228637*** 
-6  0.437705  2.376956**  1.027202  5.013088*** 
-5  0.592522  3.346280***  1.183094  5.374692*** 
-4  0.598463  3.160672***  1.424188  6.336834*** 
-3  0.673227  3.369772***  1.895305  7.339178*** 
-2  1.055852  4.978101***  1.714117  6.311741*** 
-1  2.451450  9.040694***  1.443817  4.760019*** 
0  14.660618  26.308445***  -10.326258  -20.474300*** 
1  1.510407  4.823650***  -0.783581  -3.047420*** 
2  -0.256768  -0.982589  -0.548478  -2.523280** 
3  -0.354136  -1.464886  -0.408084  -2.015040** 
4  -0.538773  -1.658767*  -0.232604  -1.283380 
5  -0.157455  -0.750889  -0.538020  -2.821920*** 
6  -0.265152  -1.313957  -0.435337  -2.366300** 
7  -0.246704  -1.255414  -0.227266  -1.373060 
  ***Denotes significance at the 1% level (two-tailed test) 
  **Denotes significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test)   
  *Denotes significance at the 10% level (two-tailed test) 
The average daily abnormal returns for the winners and losers in period 2001-2003 are 
shown in Table 2. Consistent with the results in the pre-crisis period, we document the 
evidence of overreaction for the winners but not for the losers in the post-crisis period. 
After a large price increase for winners, a significant price reversals occur on day t = 4 
at 10% level while the average daily abnormal returns are negative but not statistically 
significant for six of the seven days following the day t = 0.  
In  both  tables,  we  observed  that  positive  daily  abnormal  returns  during  seven  days 
preceding the day of the large price decline are statistically significant at the % 1 and % 
5  levels.  This  indicates that  there  is  no  information  leakage  in  pre-event  period  for 
losers.  
It is also interesting to note, from Figure 1 and 3, that cumulative abnormal returns 
earned by stocks indicated a large increase in price during a single trading day for the 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 190 stocks that exhibited a large price 







































Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 190 stocks that exhibited a large price 









































Figure 2 and 4 exhibits cumulative abnormal returns earned by stocks indicated a large 
price decline during a single trading day for the period surrounding the day of the price 
decline both in pre- and post-crisis period. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 190 stocks that exhibited a large price 







































Figure 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 190 stocks that exhibited a large price 











































The results obtained for the winners in pre- and post-crisis period indicates a significant 
evidence of overreaction. (See Figure 1 and 3) However, as seen from the results in 
Figures 2 and 4, the overreaction is not induced for losers both in pre- and post-crisis 
period. 
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The analysis of the pre- and post-crisis period results reveals the impact of the Turkish 
financial crisis, which caused a more volatile market. In this crisis period, the market is 
expected to be less efficient and heavily overreact to bad news. Yet, the findings of this 
study are rather surprising since the overreaction of the winners is more obvious in pre-
crisis  period  than  the  post-crisis  period.  Moreover,  the  losers  do  not  overreact 
significantly to information before and after the crisis. These results indicate that the 
stock market is more efficient than expected after the crisis, meaning that exhibiting less 
overreaction.  To  avoid  the  risk  during  the  crisis  period,  investors  become  more 
conservative toward bad news and information. With the decrease of noise traders in the 
crisis, the importance of overreaction also decreases. However, when investors receive 
good news and information, the initial price increases in stocks encourage the noise 
traders to invest which leads to an increase the magnitude of overreaction. 
Conclusion 
This paper highlights the empirical evidence of short term overreaction in the Turkish 
stock market. It differs from the previous studies in that this study considers the impact 
of the Turkish financial crisis by decomposing the whole sample into two sub periods, 
pre-  and  post-crisis  period.  We  find  that  stocks  that  display  a  large  price  increase 
(winners) show an evidence of overreaction in the shot run, however, stocks that display 
a large price decline (losers) indicate no significant evidence. We also find the price 
reversal for winners in pre-crisis period is more pronounced than in post-crisis period. 
These results indicate a diminished degree of overreaction after the crisis period which 
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